

**IDEOLOGY, ALLIANCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA – A
CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED PROGRESSIVE GRAND ALLIANCE**

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ABSTRACT

Since 1954, the Nigerian political scene has witnessed the formation and dissolution of several electoral and governing alliances; however, none was anchored on compatibility and glued by ideology. All, including the ruling All Progressives Congress (an alliance of four parties), were/are anchored on political expediencies and the unrestrained desire to seize power, sit on the structural frame and control the system of rewards. This article examines the prevailing political situation that led to the formation (in 1964) of the United Progressive Grand Alliance, UPGA by two erstwhile politically irreconcilable parties – the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Action Group (AG). It posits that the formation of the alliance had no modicum of ideological underpinnings but was purely an outcome of the precarious political situation both parties found themselves. The article argues that one of the reasons for lack or absence of sustainable development in Nigeria is the fact that members of the political class convoke alliances for the purposes of winning elections and not to initiate and drive national development. It concludes that since an alliance whose members are ideologically estranged would almost always fatally fail; the UPGA did not only turn out to be a fatal failure; it arrested the political, social and economic development of the newly independent state and, alongside its inveterate rival, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), contributed immensely to the chain of events that sounded the death knell of Nigeria's First Republic.

Keywords: Sustainable, Development, Government, Alliance, Ideology, Politics, Nigeria,

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS AND PARTIES IN NIGERIA, 1908-1951

Alliance, in the context of this article, refers to any formal commitment of two or more political parties for political objectives, particularly winning elections and thereby controlling what Michael Vickers and Kenneth Post term ‘systems of rewards’¹ either at the state, regional or federal levels. Thus, alliance is used in this article in the same sense as coalition defined by Lester and Cary as ‘explicit [political] working relationships among groups for the purpose of achieving a public policy’.² There are two types of alliances - electoral and governing. While the former are formed for the primary purpose of winning elections, the latter are formed for the purposes of forming a government. The United Progressive Grand Alliance was formed to serve both ends: to win the 1964 federal elections and form the post-election federal government. In its simplest form, ideology is a concise and clear body of beliefs held by a political party. This is predicated on a comprehensive theory of human nature which could require long political struggle to attain or accomplish. The ideal implication of the above should be that political parties with reconcilable ideologies and who could work on the same political wavelength would form alliances that are able to drive sustainable development defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development as the ability to harmoniously utilise and manage technology and socio-political and economic formations to achieve excellent living condition for man in the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.³ The United Progressive Grand Alliance, UPGA, the focus of this article, was formed in 1964 to contest the federal elections of that year with the aim of wresting power from the Northern People’s Congress, NPC, the Northern Nigeria-based political party that had dominated Nigerian politics at the federal level since 1954, when the first federal elections were held. That alliance, like others before and after it, was a product of political desperation rather than a logical and thoughtful outcome of philosophical and ideological underpinnings. Hence, rather than sustain the development of the Nigerian nation; the alliance imperilled the negligible development the country had at that point of her history. However, to fully grasp the background to the formation of faltering alliances in Nigeria, a brief examination of the emergence and development of political associations and parties in the country is essential.

1908 and 1951 are important dates in the political history of Nigeria – while what could be described as the first modern political association was formed in the former; full party politics began in the latter. The People’s Union (PU) was formed in Lagos⁴ in 1908 by two leading medical practitioners, John K. Randle and Orisadipe Obasa. The Union was formed to protest

¹ K.W.J Post & Michael Vickers, *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1966*, London: Heinemann, 1973, p. 7.

² Lester Seligman & Cary Covington, *The Coalitional Presidency*, California: Brooks & Cole Publishing Company, 1989, p.8.

³ Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, p. 16. Retrieved from <http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf> on 2 December 2017.

⁴ Lagos occupied a special position in the intellectual, social, economic and political development and emancipation of Nigeria. For example, a total of 51 newspapers were published in Nigeria between 1880 and 1937. These consisted of 11 dailies, 33 weeklies, 3 fortnightlies and 4 monthlies. With the exception of 15 provincial weeklies, all these newspapers were published in Lagos. See Fred I. A. Omu, *Press and Politics in Nigeria. 1880–1937*, London: Longman, 1978, particularly pp. 1–26; 252–255. See also R. C. Okonkwo “The Press and the Formation of Pre-Independence Political Parties in Nigeria”, *Nigerian Magazine*, No. 137, 1981, pp. 66–73. For another detailed study on the importance and

against Governor Walter Egerton's proposed water rate. Early in 1908, government had decided to introduce pipe-borne water into Lagos and requested Lagosians to pay for the water project. But Lagosians opposed the imposition of water rate on them since the Europeans would almost certainly exclusively be the beneficiaries of the scheme. The protest against the water rate was led by the People's Union and it was so well organised and successful that it compelled Egerton to suspend the scheme. The People's Union also spearheaded opposition to the British colonial administration's attempt to introduce a land tenure programme into the Western Provinces. If there was ever any policy which (Yoruba) traditional societies would oppose, it was certainly one whose purpose was to take land away from them. As the *Morning Post* rightly put it "there is no subject on which the West Coast native is more tenacious of his rights, more apt to resent interference and more willing to believe evil of the white men than this question of land [sic]".⁵ Governor MacGregor himself noted that "in dealing with the native, one must never touch their right in lands...If one wished to stir up trouble...all one would have to do would be to suggest that the land of the native is about to be taken away from them".⁶ It is therefore not surprising that the British attempt to introduce a land tenure programme into the Western Provinces drew the wrath of the natives. Again, the protest was led by the People's Union and it was a huge success.

However, by 1916, the People's Union had become moribund.⁷ Two factors were responsible for this. One, during the First World War, the British did not tolerate any form of agitation that could jeopardise her war efforts; and two, Randle and Obasa's volte-face and dramatic reversal of their position on the water rate controversy and eventual support of the colonial government's proposal. Indeed, Randle later argued that "the provision of pipe borne water might stamp out or reduce the incidence of guinea-worm infection in Lagos". The people of Lagos were surprised at this inconsistency and consequently withdrew their support from the People's Union⁸. Indeed, by June 1916, the People's Union had become "a moribund political club".⁹ While Randle's argument and reason for his volte-face may be true; he probably capitulated because of pressure or promise of reward. Generally, Nigeria has not had individuals with iron heart who are ready to stoically resist pressure, shun rewards and bear crippling pain in an attempt to kick start or fast track sustainable development. One prominent factor that precipitated the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917 was the availability of individuals who were prepared to go to the guillotine or be despatched to Siberia for the good of ordinary Russians. For example, on 8 May 1887, Aleksandr Ulyanov (Vladimir Lenin's elder brother) was executed for plotting to assassinate Tsar Alexander II. Although, he manufactured the nitroglycerine used in making the bomb, he was not one of those designated to throw it at the Tsar. He therefore stood a good chance of being pardoned if he had, as his mother unsuccessfully requested him to, asked for imperial clemency. At the point of being executed, Ulyanov said "among the Russian people there will always be found many people

contributions of Lagos to Nigerian politics, see Patrick Cole, *Modern and Traditional Elites in the Politics of Lagos*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. For detailed discussions of its growth, early history and British conquest, see among others, Robert Smith, "The Lagos Consulate, 1851-1861: An Outline" *Journal of African History* Vol. XV, No .3, 1974, pp. 393-416; W.D. McIntyre "Commander Glover and the Colony of Lagos, 1861-73" *Journal of African History*, Vol. IV No. 1, 1963, pp. 57-79 and P.M. Mbaeyi, "Lagos and the British, 1871-1874" *Ikenga: Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January, 1972, pp. 27-42

⁵ Quoted from Patrick Cole, *Modern and Traditional Elites in the Politics of Lagos* p. 89.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ According to Tekene Tamuno, by 1916, the People's Union had become 'fitful'. See his *Nigeria and Elective Representation*, London: Heinemann, 1966, p. 42.

⁸ S.O. Arifalo, *The Egbe Omo Oduduwa: A Study in Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism*, Akure: Stebak, 2001, pp.5-6.

⁹ *African Messenger*, 12 June 1916

who are so devoted to their ideas and who feel so bitterly the unhappiness of their country that it will not be a sacrifice for them to offer their lives...my purpose was to aid in the liberation of the unhappy Russian people...there is no death more honourable than death for the common good".¹⁰ In the same vein, Samuil Yakovlevich Marshak, one of the radical Soviet's authors who survived Stalin's reign of terror summarised the torture he and his radical colleagues were subjected to thus "we were living in daily terror of a knock at our door at night, summoning us to exile in Siberia without rhythm or reason. But we took it stoically and used to keep our small bundle of cloths ready to take with us into exile at any time".¹¹

The demise of the People's Union led to the emergence of a socio-political body known as the Reform Club (RC) in December 1920. However, the Reform Club was nothing more than the reincarnation of the People's Union as it was led by Randle and Obasa as President and Secretary respectively. Like its predecessor, membership of the Reform Club was drawn from the well-to-do and Lagos intelligentsia. It must be stressed however that these political associations did not demand radical changes in government policy, neither did they question or challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule. Indeed, Kitoye Ajasa, one of the leaders of the Reform Club, asserted that "we in West Africa have been for generations under British rule and with that rule we are satisfied".¹² From the above, it is obvious that these early political associations were in the form of 'primary resistance' to British rule in that they were particular or on-the-spor of the moment responses to particular imperial measures deemed oppressive, onerous or inimical to the socio-economic well-being of Nigerians. These associations did not demand fundamental challenges from the British colonial administration neither did they have the objective of achieving self-rule for Nigeria. This validates Azikiwe's view that up to 1922, there was no well-established political party in Nigeria but only "sporadic attempts to organize pressure groups in order to register protests against certain measures in which their sponsors had interest".¹³ Indeed, these political associations were organised principally to protest against the tax and land policies of the British colonial administration. They possessed no solid organisational effectiveness and apparatus neither did they question the legitimacy of colonial rule.

Elective principle in Nigeria came with the Clifford Constitution of 1922 which conferred restricted and conditional franchise on certain classes of Nigerians. Four elective seats were allocated: three to the municipality of Lagos and one to Calabar.¹⁴ There were three levels of restrictions under the 1922 constitution. One, only adult males could vote. Two, the enfranchised must possess a residential qualification of 12 months; and three, a £100 yearly income. This is what Duverger termed 'timocracy'¹⁵ that is, democracy based on limited franchise. As a result of these restrictions, eligible voters in both

¹⁰ Helen Rappaport, *Conspirator: Lenin in Exile. The Making of a Revolutionary*, London: Windmill Books, 2010, pp. xxiv-xxv.

¹¹ T.N. Kaul, *Stalin to Gorbachev and Beyond*, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991, p. xvi.

¹² Arifalo, p. 7.

¹³ Quoted from Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Zik: A Selection From the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 304. For a detailed chronological discussion of the emergence of political parties in Nigeria, see *ibid*, pp. 301-334.

¹⁴ The limiting of the franchise to Lagos and Calabar was because of the colonial officials' assumption that these two towns were, at that point in time, the only places that had sufficiently large numbers of educated and enlightened citizens capable of understanding and using the franchise.

¹⁵ Maurice Duverger, *The Idea of Politics. The Uses of Power in Society*, London: Methuen & Co. 1966, p.89.

municipalities were not more than four thousand i.e. three thousand in Lagos and one thousand in Calabar.¹⁶ The controversy that arose from the debate over whether to accept or reject the Clifford Constitution inspired the formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)¹⁷ on 24 June 1923 with the motto *salus populi suprema lex*.¹⁸ The primary objective of the NNDP was

to secure the safety and welfare of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of British Imperial Commonwealth and to carry the banner of 'Right, Truth, Liberty and Justice' to the empyrean heights of democracy until the realization of the ambitious goal of government of the people by the people for the people¹⁹

The original planners of the NNDP were Thomas Horatio Jackson, Bagan Benjamin and Herbert Macaulay. During the entire period of its existence, the NNDP was virtually confined to Lagos. The party concerned itself mainly with local matters, particularly elections to the Legislative Council every five years and to the Lagos Town Council every three years. The bedrock of the party was its component of chiefs, Imams and market women leaders.

From about 1929, the political consciousness of the Lagos intelligentsia was stimulated by a controversy over the colonial administration's policy to increase the number of Nigerian technical and medical assistants through vocational education of a sub-professional quality. Many Nigerian elite felt that if the above policy was implemented, it would lead to a diversion of interest and talent from liberal to vocational studies which would confine Nigerians to inferior jobs under European specialists. Thus, when the Yaba Higher College was founded as a vocational institution to run diploma programmes, many Nigerian elite opposed the College's inferior status. In order to successfully propagate their ideas on the kind of educational policy they wanted for Nigeria and present a common front against the colonial administration's educational policy, a number of young men, mainly students and graduates of King's College, formed the Lagos Youth Movement in 1934. The Movement was re-named the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1936. The founding members of the Movement were Dr. J.C. Vaughan, Ernest Ikoli, H.O. Davies and Samuel Akisanya. In 1937, the Movement was strengthened by the return to Nigeria of Dr. Azikiwe from the Gold Coast. In 1938, the NYM won the election to the Lagos Town Council and the elective seats in the Legislative Council thereby terminating the NNDP's 15-year dominance of Lagos politics. To strengthen the Movement and give it a pan-Nigeria outlook, branches of the Movement were established in many urban areas throughout Nigeria. The

¹⁶ See Martin Kilson Jr. "The Rise of Nationalist Organisations and Parties in British West Africa", *Africa from the Point of View of American Negro Scholars*, New York: The American Society of African Culture, 1963, p.58.

¹⁷ The original planners of the NNDP were Thomas Horatio Jackson, Bagan Benjamin and Herbert Macaulay. The first president of the Party was Egerton Shyngle. Macaulay however became the most popular leader of the NNDP. Herbert Samuel Heelas Macaulay, a civil engineer by training, surveyor by occupation, journalist and politician by inclination, was born in Lagos in 1864 to Reverend Thomas Babington Macaulay, founder of the CMS Grammar School, Lagos and maternal grandson of the Right Rev. Samuel Ajayi Crowder, first African Bishop of the Niger Territory. It must be stated however that even though Macaulay's NNDP bestrode Lagos politics like a colossus between 1923 and 1933, Macaulay himself did not contest election either into the Legislative Council or Lagos Town Council because of a legal disability. He was not eligible for public office because of what *West Africa* referred to as 'two criminal convictions' - first, for an alleged misappropriation of trust funds and second, for a criminal libel alleging a plan to assassinate the exiled *Oba* of Lagos, Eshugbaya Eleko. See *West Africa*, 28 August & 22 September 1928 and Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African Nation*, New York & Enugu: Nok Publishers, 1963, p. 46.

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ Tekene Tamuno, *Nigeria and Elective Representation*, p. 25. For a summary of the aims and objectives of the NNDP, see 'Address to the NNDP by Herbert Macaulay' *West African Pilot*, 3 June 1938; 'Memorandum of Proposals placed before the Under-Secretary on behalf of the National Democratic Party' and 'Notes of an interview between African leaders of Southern Nigeria and the Colonial Mission headed by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary'. *West Africa*, 10 April, 1926.

strength of the NYM laid in its emphasis on inter-tribal amity which was the theme of the Movement's Charter and Constitution of 1938.²⁰ However, by 1941 the NYM had begun to wane in influence and popularity.²¹

Thomas Hodgkin has described the Second World War as “a forcing house of new political movements in West Africa”.²² It would be re-called that on 14 August 1941, the United States and Britain issued the Atlantic Charter. The major political clause of the Charter was the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and not to have boundary changes imposed on them from outside. Nationalists in British West Africa interpreted the right of ‘self determination’ as enunciated by the Atlantic Charter as a promise of self government. Consequently, in 1943, the West African Press delegation visiting London and led by Dr. Azikiwe, requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies to initiate a programme that would enable African states to become independent within fifteen years: ten years of representative government and five years of limited tutelage with ‘responsible government’.²³

On 10 June 1944, the Nigerian Union of Students (NUS) convened a mass meeting in the Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos, to consider the following, among other things: the possibility of raising funds for a national school and the immediate formation of a representative national committee.²⁴ Herbert Macaulay presided at the meeting and resolutions favouring the formation of a National Council were passed. Consequently, the NUS issued a ‘call from the youth’ inviting all patriotic associations to attend the inaugural meeting of the National Council of Nigeria. The meeting was held on 26 August 1944 and was attended by more than forty organisations including political associations, tribal unions, trade unions, literary associations, professional associations, etc. A resolution expressing the determination of the National Council “to work in unity for the realisation of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British Empire” was adopted.²⁵ The chairman of the inaugural meeting of the National Council was Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian who founded and edited the *Lagos Comet*. At the inaugural meeting, Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe were elected President and General Secretary respectively while Dr. Akinola Maja and Oluwole Alakija declined the subordinate offices of Vice President and Legal Adviser respectively. By January 1945, the National Council comprised more than 87 member unions including three Cameroonian groups, hence the change of name to National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. (NCNC, later interpreted by the AG as ‘Nigerian Cheating Nigerians and the Cameroons’).²⁶

At inception, the NCNC was pan-Nigeria in orientation. The party sought a broad national base for the struggle against colonialism. Although, its early membership included many Yoruba both in Lagos and in the hinterland, an overwhelming proportion of its membership was Igbo and Ibibio. This may have been because the Igbo and the Ibibio had more clan or

²⁰ For extracts from the NYM Charter, see Obafemi Awolowo, *Awo. The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 121–123.

²¹ For a detailed examination of the factors that were responsible for this, see this author's “The Nigerian Democratic Process: Party Politics and Alliances of Political Parties, 1951–1983”, PhD Thesis, Department of History & International Studies, Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria, 2012, pp. 97–100.

²² Thomas Hodgkin “Political Parties in British and French West Africa”, *Information Digest*, No. 10, London: 1953, p. 14.

²³ See *West African Pilot*, 27 August, 1943.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 7 June, 1944.

²⁵ *West African Pilot*, 28 August, 1944.

²⁶ *Nigerian Tribune*, 26 May, 1951.

town associations than any other groups in the country. It is significant to note that of the 101 tribal associations which affiliated to the NCNC, 37 belonged to these two groups alone.²⁷ In his Presidential Address to the eighth Annual Convention of his Party in June 1959, Dr. Azikiwe said "...according to the National Secretariat, there are now 315 branches of the NCNC scattered over West Africa and the United Kingdom as follows: Eastern Nigeria 142; Western Nigeria 126; Northern Nigeria 37; Lagos 1; Ghana 5; Sierra Leone 2; Liberia 1; United Kingdom 1. These branches have a total membership of slightly over 500,000 financially active members".²⁸ The above claim notwithstanding, by the mid 1950s, the leaderships of the NCNC and that of the Ibo State Union had become inextricably linked together so that the NCNC's claim to national orientation and spread had become questionable. It must be pointed out however, without any fear of contradiction, that an objective assessment of the status of the major political parties in Nigeria would reveal that by 1951, the NCNC was clearly the most national political party in the country. For example, John Umolu, a Bini, won elections in Port Harcourt while a Fulani, Umoru Altine, became a very prominent politician in Enugu and was elected Mayor of Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region, for two terms.²⁹

As pointed out earlier, full party politics began in Nigeria in 1951. Party politics, within the context of this article, means the scheming and manoeuvring of political parties to gain control of the machinery of government at the federal level. Although, the elective principle was introduced into the country in 1922 under the Clifford Constitution, the territorial limitation of the area of operation of the constitution makes it difficult to argue that full party politics began in the country in 1922. In addition to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), two political parties, the Action Group (AG) and the Northern People's Congress (NPC)³⁰ were launched in 1951 thus bringing the number of major political parties in the country to three. The Nigerian political scene was dominated by these parties and their allies between 1951 and 1966³¹ and by

²⁷ Awolowo *The Autobiography of Obafemi Awolowo*, p. 53.

²⁸ "NCNC: Sixteen Months to Freedom", mimeographed, p. 2.

²⁹ Eme O. Awa, *Federal Government in Nigeria*, Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, p. 128; *Saturday Sun*, 3 October 2011.

³⁰ The Northern People's Congress was formed by the merger of two cultural groups - the Dr. A.R.B. Dikko-led *Jam'yyar Tama'ar Arewa* (Northern Nigeria Congress) and the Mallam D.A. Rafih-led *Jam'iyyar Mutanem Arewa Yau* (the Association of Northern People of Today). On 12 October 1948, it was agreed by these two that their cultural associations merge into one. The new association that resulted from this merger was called *Jam'iyyar Mutanem Arewa* (Northern Nigeria Congress). The NPC held its inaugural meeting at Kaduna on 26 June 1949 where Dr A.R.B. Dikko was elected President. On 1 October 1951, it was announced that the NPC with 65 branches and 6,000 members had been converted into a political party with Alhaji Sanda as President and the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa becoming members. See Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African Nation*, pp.91-96.

³¹ Following a disastrous schism that occurred in the Action Group in 1962, things fell apart for the hitherto well-organised and highly disciplined party. On 30 May, the Tafawa Balewa-led Federal Government invoked section 65 (which reads 'Parliament may at any time make laws for Nigeria or a part thereof...for the purpose of maintaining or securing peace, order and good government...') of the Nigerian Constitution and declared a state of emergency in Western Nigeria. The motion for the declaration of a state of emergency in the West was moved by the Prime Minister and passed by 232 votes against 44 in the Federal Parliament. For the full debate, see National Archives Ibadan: NL/H2: Debates of the Federal House of Representatives, cmd. 2167-2228 (pp.1100 ff). For the seat numbers and names of the supporters and opposers of the motion, see *ibid* cmd. 2206-2211. The AG-controlled Western Regional Government was sacked and replaced by the Dr. Majekodunmi-led Emergency Administration. From this point onwards, the AG ceased being the cohesive and effective party it had been since 1951. See also *Daily Times*, 30 May 1962; Obafemi Awolowo, *The Travails of Democracy and the Rule of Law*, Ibadan: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1985, p.146.

their re-incarnations between 1979 and 1983.

According to AG leaders, the party was formed for the following, among other reasons. One, to avert the danger of enthroning ignorant and unprincipled demagogues peddling nationalism for the sake of their stomachs.; two, to arrest the purposelessness which ensured that the country drifted on aimlessly; three, to create an atmosphere in which honest and descent citizens and the brains in the country could come forward and work towards the installation of a democratic federal system of government in Nigeria; four, to achieve national progress and liberate the country from foreign yoke; and five, to develop and modernise the educational and social services in the country.³² The foundation members of the AG were Obafemi Awolowo, Abiodun Akerele, S.O. Shonibare, Ade Akinsanya, J.O. Adigun, Olatunji Docemo, B.A Akinsanya and S.T Oredein. At its inaugural conference of 28–29 April 1951 at Owo, South Western Nigeria, officers for the new party were elected. Obafemi Awolowo became National President; Hon. Gaius Obaseki, Chief N.F. Mowarin, Chief M.A. Ajasin and Chief Arthur Prest became Vice Presidents; Chief Bode Thomas became the General Secretary; Anthony Enahoro and S.O. Sonibare were elected Assistant Secretaries while S.O. Ighodaro became Treasurer; S.T. Oredein Administrative Secretary and S.L. Akintola and M.E.R. Okorodudu became Legal Advisers.³³ Perhaps, the most important point to note here is that the AG was launched as a regional party. The party announced itself as a “western regional political organization”. It is for this reason that Chief Awolowo had been accused of introducing ethnic politics into Nigeria. Before the party began to spread its tentacles to other regions, its two hundred branches and twenty thousand members were all in the Western Region.³⁴ The regional tendencies of the Action Group had profound impact on the Nigerian democratic process. On 1 October 1950 (barely five months after the formation of the AG), the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was launched in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria. The NPC was formed by northerners, for northerners to pursue northern goals. Thus, with the NCNC virtually becoming an Igbo party, the AG claiming to champion Yoruba political aspirations and the NPC pursuing northern goals, ethnicity became the hallmark of Nigerian politics. This, in turn, compelled the formation of alliances which, unfortunately, were unable to initiate, drive or sustain development.

THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED PROGRESSIVE GRAND ALLIANCE

At the end of the ‘independence election’ held on 12 December 1959, the conservative NPC and the self-styled progressive NCNC had formed the federal government throwing the AG, which was increasingly assuming a rather radical outlook, into the opposition. However, being political strange bed-fellows who found it impossible to operate on the same political wavelengths; the NPC/NCNC alliance floundered over irreconcilable standpoints.³⁵ The failure of the alliance was

³² “*Forward to Freedom, Action Group Manifesto for the First Federal Elections under the Amended [1951] Constitution*” chapters I & II, pp. 2–3.

³³ See *Daily Service* 21 March 1951 and Richard Sklar, pp. 105–106

³⁴ K.W.J. Post. *The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 36.

³⁵ For a detailed examination of the background to the alliance as well as the twists and turns that assailed it, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “The Nigerian Democratic Process: Party Politics and Alliances of Political Parties, 1951–1983” and “The Politics of the Formation of Alliance Governments in Multi-Ethnic States: A Case Study of the Nigerian First Alliance Government, 1954-1957”, *Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d’histoire*, XLVI, autumn/automne, 2011, pp. 333-366. .

predictable: rather than concentrate on stirring the ship of the newly independent state so as to ensure its viability and sustain its development; the alliance members spent time and harnessed resources in launching offensives and counter-offensives against each other. Given the lopsidedness of the Nigerian Federation and the ‘demographical tyranny’ of Northern Nigeria; the NCNC was well aware that an alliance with a political party other than the NPC was non-negotiable for a good electoral showing in the 1964 elections. Consequently, the party turned to its traditional foe, the AG, for an alliance. This alliance, formed on 3 June, 1964 was christened the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The UPGA, interpreted by S.L. Akintola³⁶ as ‘Useless People’s Godless Alliance’ was made up of the NCNC, AG, and Northern Progressive Front (NPF, which comprised the Northern Elements Progressive Union and United Middle Belt Congress), Kano People’s Party (KPP) and Zamfara Commoners Party (ZCP).³⁷ On 20 August 1964, a counter-weight alliance was formed: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), interpreted by Samuel Aluko, an AG diehard, as “Non-Nationalists Adventurers”.³⁸ This alliance comprised the NPC, Nigerian National Democratic Party, Dynamic Party, Mid-West Democratic Front (MDF), Niger Delta Congress (NDC), Lagos State United Front (LSUF) and the Republican Party (RP). Candidates who contested for parliamentary seats in the 1964 federal elections did so under these alliance groups.

It must be emphasised that the UPGA was an enforced association of incompatibles. Its two major partners, the NCNC and the AG, were poles apart in matters of ideology, party structure and discipline.³⁹ Right from the foundation of the AG, its ideology was hinted to be “democracy and socialism”.⁴⁰ Indeed, in its editorial comment of 30 July 1951, the *Nigerian Tribune* (the AG’s unofficial mouth piece) portrayed the NCNC leader, Dr. Azikiwe, as a rich man and warned about the danger of capitalism if he were to become “the supreme authority in Nigerian politics”. Also in 1954, Chief S. L. Akintola, the AG’s Deputy Leader, described the Action Group victory at the Ikeja by-election as the people’s endorsement of the party’s “socialist and progressive” politics.⁴¹ The party manifesto for the federal election of that year was even more forthright in its support for socialism. In it, the party declared that it was “irrevocably committed to an ideology which places the interests of the masses first and vests in the state and public-owned corporations all the major means of production, distribution and exchange”.⁴² Indeed, shortly after it lost the 1959 federal elections, the AG adopted an ideology entitled ‘Democratic Socialism’. On the other hand, the NCNC, as the *Nigerian Tribute* quoted above pointed out, was capitalist-

³⁶ Samuel Ladoke Akintola, from Ogbomoso, South Western Nigeria, was one of the leaders of the Action Group. He was appointed the Premier of the Western Region in 1959 and shortly afterwards fell out with Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the national leader of his party. Akintola’s splinter party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, formed an alliance (the Nigerian National Alliance) with the NPC for the 1964 federal elections and the regional elections of the following year. He was one of the victims of the January 1966 military coup that eclipsed the First Republic.

³⁷ See <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng>.

³⁸ *Nigerian Tribune*, 23 December 1964

³⁹ For a detailed examination of the ideology of the Action Group, see A.A. Ayoade, “Party and Ideology in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Action Group”, *Journal of Black Studies*, December, 1985, pp. 169–188 and Shola J. Omotola, “Nigerian Parties and Political Ideology”, *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009, pp. 612–634.

⁴⁰ *Nigerian Tribune*, 8 May, 1951

⁴¹ *Daily Service*, 20 July, 1954.

⁴² *Nigerian Tribune*, 17 August, 1954

oriented though with strong support for federalism. With reference to discipline, the two parties had no common ground: while discipline was the hallmark of the AG; indiscipline was a visible trait of the NCNC.⁴³

However, in 1964, the desire to capture power at the federal level, rather than the glue of ideology and the desire to initiate and sustain national development compelled an alliance between the two parties. Apparently, the census controversy over the 1963/64 census figures which ended in favour of the NPC did not please the NCNC. Also, given the fact that acrimony and rancour were the hallmarks of the NPC/NCNC alliance;⁴⁴ the NCNC could not conceive the idea of another round of alliance with the NPC. Thus, the NCNC desired an alliance with the AG because that was probably virtually the only option opened to it. This may have informed the view expressed by the MDF (an ally of the NPC) that the NCNC showed interest in the AG only when it found itself in difficulty. Referring to the post-1959 election negotiations and the 1962 AG crisis, the MDF recalled that on each occasion, the NCNC supported the NPC and the UPP against the AG.⁴⁵ Indeed Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh dismissed the alliance as a marriage of convenience.⁴⁶ Thus, even though Mbazulike Amechi opined that the NCNC/AG alliance was in the overall interest of the people of the progressive elements in the country; the alliance was actually in the interest and survival of the NCNC. This was because, by 1964, politically, the NCNC had its back against the wall. Having been a junior partner in a rancorous and acrimonious alliance with the NPC and having lost the census battle, the only alternative opened to the NCNC was the formation of an alliance with the AG. Thus, the NCNC engaged in an unprincipled search for a short term ally with which to bolster its dwindling political fortunes. On the other hand, the situation with the AG was grave and extremely desperate. By 1964, the AG was a sinking party. With at least 13 of its 75 members elected to the Federal House of Representatives in 1959 now in other political parties;⁴⁷ its high-ranking leaders behind bars; the defection of many of its members to other political parties and a devastating exclusion from the systems of rewards since 1962, the AG was a political beggar with little or no choice. There was therefore a double coincidence of political want in the formation of the UPGA, which, for all intents and purposes was an alliance of last resort and certainly not an alliance to court or pursue sustainable development.

Since the alliance was not a product of ideological compatibility or common programme, its hallmark was political treachery⁴⁸ and could hardly be said to be meaningful except in so far as necessity kept the Action Group and the NCNC together. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa made this point very clearly when he dismissed the UPGA as a collection of one-time bitter

⁴³ For an analysis of this view, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, "The Nigerian Democratic Process: Party Politics and Alliances of Political Parties, 1951–1983", particularly chapter 2, pp. 85–108.

⁴⁴ At the conclusion of the 1959 federal elections, the NPC and the NCNC had formed the federal government. The former, with 148 seats in the federal parliament, was the senior partner (the NCNC had 89 seats). The alliance was an outcome of the deadly animosity both parties exhibited against the AG rather than a product of ideological compatibility. Consequently, throughout all its turbulent life; the alliance was a thoroughly unhappy one.

⁴⁵ *Daily Express*, 2 December, 1963.

⁴⁶ *West African Pilot*, 2 December, 1963.

⁴⁷ Richard Sklar, p. 266.

⁴⁸ For example, the NCNC found it convenient to participate in the so-called 'Broad-based Government' despite the exclusion of its alliance partner from it. Whereas, in June 1964, the NCNC said it made a mistake by coalescing with the NPC to run the Federal Government after the 1959 election and said that the mistake would not be repeated. *Nigerian Citizen*, 21 June, 1964.

opponents who became friends overnight for reasons of 'greed, ambition and selfishness'. Since Balewa knew too well that there was no modicum of ideology in the formation of the UPGA; he predicted that the alliance would break up as soon as the 1964 election results were known.⁴⁹ Although, the UPGA may not have immediately broken down after the 1964 election results were known; it served no useful purpose thereafter. For example, the NCNC found it convenient to participate in the so-called 'Broad Based Government' despite the exclusion of its alliance partner from it. It should be added however that the same 'reasons of greed, ambition and selfishness' informed the formation of the NNA. While it is true that the UPGA began to show signs of stress almost as soon as it was formed;⁵⁰ Balewa's NNA was not a product of ideological compatibility either.

THE IMPACT OF THE UPGA ON THE NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Following its formation and given the purpose(s) for which it was formed, the UPGA engaged the NNA in cut-throat political rivalry which had far-reaching impact on the Nigerian democratic process and national development. Among other things, both alliances utilised the power of incumbency to the fullest. For example, apart from arresting, detaining and jailing some members of the UPGA, the NNA deliberately prevented some candidates of the former from filing nomination papers and declared several of its candidates unopposed even when they were not.⁵¹ In addition, the alliances engaged in election rigging and state-sponsored thuggery, violence and arson. Alhaji Aminu Kano summarised the situation thus:

The merciless beating up of supporters of opposition parties and compelling them to join the party in power or else face series of brutality and prosecution is beyond commonsense. At present [26 August 1964], there are over 200 members of the NEPU jailed on various pretexts in Sokoto Province. Thousands of UMBC supporters are languishing in prison in Ti Division while over 100 people have lost their lives. Thousands upon thousands of our party supporters were dumped into jails like bundles of wood or animals; some were brutally killed...wickedness in its highest magnitude was let loose and the ordinary mass of men were terrorized, stunned to silence and fear...law and order were raped...It was the most wicked and devilish doctrine which could not be conceived in hell itself...it was an example of sadism from which even a barbarian can shrink. To give the full account of this barbaric invasion of justice and democracy will need a volume of over five one-thousand pages⁵²

While Aminu Kano's scary outburst may have contained some elements of truth; the UPGA also spared no effort, fair or foul, in brutalising members of the NNA and using state machinery to strengthen its electoral position particularly in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria, where the NCNC held the reins of government. Even in the Western Region where the NNDDP formed the government, the AG demonstrated that it had its own apparatus of violence. For example, in 1964, two prominent NNDDP

⁴⁹*Daily Times*, 21 December, 1964.

⁵⁰ For example, in February 1965, the AG accused the NCNC of furthering its political interests while using the AG as a 'beast of burden' in the process. Post & Vickers, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁵¹ To cite an instance, in Bauchi South West, Alhaji Balewa's constituency, Azi Nyanko (UPGA and Balewa's opponent), filed a suit in which he claimed that he was prevented from filing his nomination papers. In a ruling delivered by Justice Nigel Reel on 3 April 1965, Nyako's case was dismissed because, according to Reel, it was 'inspired by malice'. See *Daily Times*, *Nigerian Citizen* and *Daily Express* 4 April, 1965.

⁵² Quoted from *Nigerian Citizen*, 26 August, 1964 & 24 March 1965.

leaders: Prince Adepoju Odufanade and Fakunmoju were killed by political thugs.⁵³ Of course, tangible socio-economic and sustainable development is impossible in a political climate characterised by murders, brigandage and arson.

The UPGA/NNA rivalry was so intense and pervasive that the former felt that, given the hate and tension soaked political climate, it would be difficult, indeed impossible, to conduct a free and fair election. Consequently, it called on Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, (the ceremonial President but sympathetic to UPGA) to dismiss the Federal Government and appoint an equal number of leaders of the two alliances to administer the Federation until the country's political climate favoured the conduct of election.⁵⁴ In a speech he prepared and never gave but which was published by the *Daily Express* of 3 January 1965, the President claimed that he held a meeting with the Prime Minister on 28 December, 1964 where he suggested to the latter that election be postponed by six months and that the United Nations be called to supervise it. According to Azikiwe, the Prime Minister insisted that elections should be held as scheduled. On the other hand, the Prime Minister dismissed Azikiwe's account as outright falsehood claiming that in all their discussions, the President never mentioned to him the question of holding or postponing elections.⁵⁵ Be that as it may, one incontrovertible fact from the above is that there was a great gulf between the holders of the two highest offices of the Nigerian Structural Frame whose duty should have been the promotion and harmonisation of plans and policies aimed at ensuring sustainable development in the country. On 30 December, the contentious election was held but it was boycotted by the UPGA in Western Nigeria thereby committing one of the costliest mistakes in the political history of Nigeria. Boycott of election is not a wise strategy in party politics because opposing political parties go to the polls and candidates who normally would have lost elections win by default. The UPGA insisted that to participate in the election would amount to compromising with evil. When it became clear that the NNA would go ahead with the election, the UPGA called on the president to summon a conference of Nigerian political parties to break up the Federation peacefully.⁵⁶

It is instructive to note that the NCNC did not boycott the elections in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria, where it held the reins of government. This may have been because the NCNC was sure of victory in any region-wide election in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions. The possibility of the NNA winning by default in the two regions should the NCNC stage a boycott apparently informed the NCNC's participation in the election. Moreover, the NCNC may have reasoned that the possibility of an AG victory in Western Nigeria was extremely remote. Whatever reasons may have informed the NCNC's participation in the election in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions, it put the AG in a devastatingly disadvantaged position – a feature of alliances that are bereft of ideological underpinnings. Although, the President did not heed UPGA's call to summon a conference of Nigerian political parties to break up the Federation peacefully, he nonetheless rejected the results of the election. The President insisted that since the rigging that characterised the election was obvious to most Nigerians, if the results of the elections were accepted, they would “reopen wounds, exacerbate feelings, prolong bitterness and hasten the exit of unity and democracy from Nigeria”.⁵⁷ Consequently, following the NNA's ‘electoral victory’ the President said he would

⁵³ See *West African Pilot*, 9 October, 1964.

⁵⁴ *Daily Express*, 20 December, 1964.

⁵⁵ *Daily Express*, 3 January, 1965.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 31 December, 1964.

⁵⁷ *Daily Express*, 1 January, 1965.

rather resign than call on anybody to form a government. Thus, the United Progressive Grand Alliance and the Nigerian National Alliance created an unprecedented electoral and constitutional debacle which left the country without a legally-constituted government for three days.

However, following a truce brokered by some prominent legal experts and political leaders, a six-point plan was agreed upon. Item two of the six-point plan recommended the formation of a broad-based government led by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister.⁵⁸ Consequently, in a nationwide broadcast in the evening of 4 January 1965, the president called on Alhaji Balewa to form a government and gave assurances that Balewa would form a 'broad-based government'. About one and a half decades later, Dr. Azikiwe gave the reason for inviting Alhaji Balewa to form a government in 1965. According to him, as at the time he invited Balewa, all the military installations in the country were in the defunct Northern Region. The reason cited by Azikiwe was probably not the primary reason for the invitation. His pen and paper militancy on the pages of newspapers notwithstanding, Dr. Azikiwe was not known for staying long in the hottest spot of political battle. Indeed, the bottom-line of his disagreement with the Zikist Movement (a radical Association formed by his political admirers and named after him) was the latter's insistence that Azikiwe must match his paper and pen battle with action; but he never really did this. Many Zikists openly criticised Azikiwe for backing down during the constitutional standoff mentioned above. Indeed, R.A.B. Okafor, Parliamentary Secretary in the Eastern Region's Ministry of Justice resigned from the Zikist Movement saying that "our great philosophy developed cold feet".⁵⁹ But, the Secretary General of the Movement pointed out that what failed was not Zikism, but the mortal form (Azikiwe) on which Zikism was hung.⁶⁰

The ambiguous phrase, 'broad-based government' mentioned above provoked immediate reactions and divergent interpretations. To many NNA leaders, it simply meant a government made up of NNA members only since the parties that formed the alliance traversed the length and breadth of the Federation. Thus, the NNA's interpretation of a 'broad-based government' was only in geographical terms; it is therefore not surprising that the 17-member broad-based government did not include any UPGA members. While it is true that Festus Okotie-Eboh and K.O. Mbadiwe, the supposed representatives of the UPGA, were members of the cabinet, they were not members of the UPGA. Okotie-Eboh, at least at that time, was more NPC than NCNC and was closer to NPC leaders than those of his party. Indeed, he and Omo Osagie opposed the formation of the UPGA and advised the Premier of the Mid-West, Chief Osadabey, not to have anything to do with it.⁶¹ The conventional reference to Okotie-Eboh as a representative of the UPGA in the so-called 'broad-based government' is not tenable since there is no evidence to show that he ever did or said anything that could be interpreted as loyalty or support for the alliance.

It would be recalled that Dr. Mbadiwe was the leader of the rebel group which christened itself the 'NCNC Reform Committee' which sought to remove Dr. Azikiwe from the presidency of the NCNC on 14 June 1958 during a meeting of the party's National Executive Committee in Lagos. At that meeting, Mr. N.O. Egesi had read two documents calling upon Dr.

⁵⁸ See *ibid*, 5 January, 1965 for details.

⁵⁹ *Daily Times*, 8 January, 1965.

⁶⁰ *Nigerian Outlook*, 11 January, 1965.

⁶¹ Dennis Osadebay, *Building a Nation*, Lagos: Macmillan, 1978, p. 164.

Azikiwe to resign his presidency of the NCNC and premiership of the Eastern Region. The principal document was signed by three persons who claimed to have lost confidence in the leadership of Azikiwe. Seven specific complaints were listed: one, the removal of Mazi Mbonu Ojike as Eastern Minister of Finance on corruption charges before the official submission of the report of the probe panel that investigated the charges; two, the removal of two ministers and three parliamentary secretaries following the 1957 elections in the Eastern Region; three, the abolition of elective national officers at the Aba Convention; four, the alleged failure of Azikiwe to support the party's policy on the question of creating additional states; five, the manner in which the Free Primary Education Programme was abandoned in Eastern Nigeria; six, the rush to build a university in the East despite the failure of the Primary Education Scheme and seven, Azikiwe's alleged lost of interest in crucial issues that had to do with the public image and well-being of the NCNC.⁶²

Consequently, the National Executive Committee of the NCNC expelled Nbadiwe and his supporters. Shortly after their expulsion the 'Reform Committee' launched the *Daily Telegraph* (in July) and formed a new party - the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons - (in August) with Nbadiwe as National Chairman.⁶³ Although, following a *reapproachment* between Drs. Azikiwe and Mbadiwe in December 1960, the latter was readmitted into the NCNC and was subsequently appointed Adviser on African Affairs to the Prime Minister; elected to the Federal House of Representatives and restored to a position of cabinet rank in the federal government. The above *reapproachment* notwithstanding, it is the opinion of the present author that up till the time he became a member of Balewa's 'broad-based government', Dr. Nbadiwe did and said nothing outstanding to protect and promote the interest of the NCNC. Thus, there were no UPGA members in the post 1964 election federal government. At any rate, appointing people who were members of the NCNC only in name and who were not likely to lift a finger to advance its interest was a very good political strategy on the part of the NPC.

Many younger and well-educated Northerners criticised Alhaji Balewa for finding a place for what they called "the NCNC old guard" in the Council of Ministers. In a critical and sarcastic article, the *Nigerian Citizen* faulted Alhaji Balewa for giving Chief Okotie-Eboh and Dr. Mbadiwe ministerial positions. It posited that no room should have been found for members of the UPGA in the Federal Executive Council and warned that should Alhaji Abubakar continue to 'transgress', he should be replaced by Sir Kashim Ibrahim, the Governor of Northern Nigeria. The paper's interpretation and definition of 'broad-based government' was a government formed by the NPC, NNDP, the Dynamic Party and other members of the NNA. The paper then suggested that Dr. Chike Obi should replace Chief Okotie-Eboh in the Council of Ministers which should include at least seven representatives of the NNDP and two each from the other southern allies of the NPC.⁶⁴ Moreover, the paper insisted that Alhaji Balewa should not appoint any member of the UPGA into any post either as minister or ambassador or even as chairman of a corporation and urged the UPGA to accept its opposition role 'which has become its destiny'.⁶⁵ Less than a month later however, the paper reversed the above position and suggested another formula for the composition of the Federal Executive Council that would foster peaceful co-existence in the country: 50% NPC; 20% NNDP; 10% for other NNA allies; 10% for Independents and the final 10% for the UPGA. The paper argued that for Nigerian democracy to

⁶² See *Daily Times*, 16 June, 1958.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Nigerian Citizen*, 27 January, 1965, *passim*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10 February, 1965.

flourish, the majority party must form alliance with minority parties, even if the former did not want to do so.⁶⁶

Although, the Prime Minister did not accept the above suggestion, it was however obvious that anytime reference was made to the inclusion of members of the UPGA in the Council of Ministers, such references applied only to the NCNC while the AG was altogether neglected and left in the lurch. The ‘broad-based’ cabinet was made up of 54 ministers, double the number in the previous government. The NPC had 22 (15 cabinet ranks); NCNC had 16 (11 cabinet ranks) while the NNDP had 14 (7 cabinet ranks). Apart from excluding the AG, it was ironic that the NCNC accepted these appointments. It would be recalled that the UPGA had earlier claimed that the number of ministers in the previous government was ‘scandalous’ and an ‘unpardonable drain upon the nation’s slender resources’.⁶⁷ Be that as it may, the NCNC’s participation in the broad-based government may have at least served one useful purpose: it doused the unprecedented electoral tension that had built up throughout the country thereby retrieving the country from chaos, at least for a while – before the alliances would once again engage in another round of fatal rivalry that would eventually consume the First Republic and a number of its prominent leaders. .

CONCLUSION

This paper contends that ideological underpinnings and compatibility is a necessary condition for the formation of a workable and purposeful alliance that could anchor and drive sustainable development. The United Progressive Grand Alliance was formed and sustained for reasons other than ideology – it was a product of political expediency and unmitigated desire to control the system of rewards. Before their marriage of convenience, the NCNC and AG were inveterate political foes but they glossed over their differences and contracted an alliance of incompatibles overnight. Consequent upon the absence of the glue of ideology; the alliance, which created an unprecedented political stalemate in Nigeria in 1964, fell asunder when the NCNC agreed to participate in an NPC-led ‘broad based government’ that altogether excluded the AG. Indeed, the democratic history of Nigeria would not have been less fascinating when placed side by side of those of other climes except for its peculiarity in terms of deficiency in ideological leanings which, under ideal situation, ought to be one of the major determinants of identity and identification of ‘parties of like minds’ that could form workable and dynamic alliances for the purposes of propelling sustainable development. Apart from keeping political parties focused and afloat, ideology positions them for national development and galvanizes them into making landmark contributions that could engender sustainable development. Thus, since the importance of the synergy between political sustainability and socio-economic development cannot be overemphasised, one of the reasons for lack of sustainable development in Nigeria is the absence of party ideology which has created a fluid and sycophantic political system – a weak foundation that cannot sustain appreciable socio-economic and technological superstructure. Indeed, rather than thrust the Nigerian state on the path of development; the UPGA and the NNA did otherwise – the alliances created one political stalemate after another. This sounded the death knell of the First Republic and ushered in military dictatorship that arrested the fledging democratic culture and sustainable development in the country for three odd decades.

⁶⁶ *Nigerian Citizen*, 20 January & 24 February, 1965.

⁶⁷ *Morning Post*, 11 November, 1964.

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