

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORKING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE OF ETHIOPIA: PREMISES AND CHALLENGES

Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh, Gubaye Assaye Alamineh

Department of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Bahir Dar University

ABSTRACT

After independence in the global south in general and in Africa in particular, the appropriateness of the role of the state in the development process has gradually become a debatable issue. The center of debate has focused on two main courses: “the minimalist state” (liberalism) and maximalist state”. Alternative to these, a developmental state ideology has emerged. The ideology is basically about creating enabling normative, structural, institutional, technical, and administrative environments in a given state to achieve its national development vision. This article aims to analyze the democratic developmental state ideology in Ethiopia by critically examining its actual performance via Amartya Sen’s capability approaches of developmental state. The study has relied on desk research approach. Accordingly, it reveals how and why Ethiopia fails to satisfy the basic standards of being a democratic developmental state as it claims to be.

Keywords: Capability Approach, Democratic, Developmental State, Premises, Challenge

INTRODUCTION

In the 1950s, Brazilian political scientists and economists identified “developmentalism” as the set of political ideas and economic strategies that flock Brazil’s hasten industrialization and the coalition of social classes identified with national development. In the early 1960s, the central notion of developmental nationalism is that the encouragement of economic development and the consolidation of nationality position as two interrelated features of a particular emancipatory process were identified. By the use of “national-developmentalism”, Brazilian society was successfully prevailed over the patrimonial state that characterized its politics until 1930. Other Latin-American countries, Mexico in particular and Asian ones, like South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, grew by implementation a developmental strategy that was conceptually grounded on a blend of “structuralist development theory and Keynesian macroeconomics”. These countries integrated state intrusion with a dynamic private sector, modeling themselves next to Japan (Carlos, 2016:).

By the early 1980s, Chalmers Johnson attempted to understand his country’s astonishing economic development, known as the Japanese state a developmental state. On the other hand, in spite of the extraordinary achievement of these countries and the foreign exchange and fiscal responsibility that generally went along with successful understanding of neoliberalism for more than thirty years, developmentalism became an offensive term tantamount with fiscal irresponsibility or populism. The representative plot was part of the new neoliberal and neo-classic hegemony’s confirmation, but not completely devoid of grounds. Without an uncertainty, starting from late 1970s a number of Latin-America countries snubbed to implement the required macroeconomic modifications and embraced populism in the name of Keynesianism (Ibid).

Starting from this time, the socio-economic development role of the state has created a hot debate both in the academy and policy circles. The debate continued mainly categorized into the liberal/neoliberal and the developmental state ideology. The former take a position that the state should have a minimal role in the economy. In its place, control of the economy should depend on the “market” and “market forces” based on the basic principles of competition on “supply and demand”. The later, take the position that the state should play a greater role in the economy, and serve as an engine of socio-economic development. After the mid 1990s, there is a new thinking concerning the role of the state in development. The new view is emanated from many respects on achievements of a number of Asian countries based on state-led development policy. The acknowledgment of the developmental success of East Asian countries has developed new world view on what the state should follow. The experience shows the fact that yet the market based economies needs functioning and capable state in order to grow and well operating. But later in the 21thc, hybrid type of thought that is democratic- developmental state has been emerged which give concern for freedom for the individuals in their political participation as well as for the state intervention in the affairs of the economy ((Kieh, 2015, and Fritz and Menocal, 2006)).

In the similar vein, scholars have been debating about the correlation between economic development and democracy in developing countries. Many intellectuals who have been predisposed by the western liberal democracy supposed that economic development realized only with the advancements of democracy. As evidence for their argument, these scholars generally present the practices of the developed countries democracy that could not be compatible with the rising developing countries.

The opposite line of thinking argues that economic and social development as precondition for realization of democracy in developing countries of Africa in general and in Ethiopia in particular (Teshome, 2016).

Contradictory debate is presented by Ethiopian scholars and politicians about the role of the state in development and democratization of country. Many scholars in Ethiopia prioritize democratization process from the economic development in the country. The other line of thinking takes improvement in social and economy life is issue of Ethiopia survival not as an option for development. And they argue that apart from economic development, the democratization process of the country weakens the structural transformation. However, there is lack of conceptual underpinning among Ethiopian scholars and even within political architects regarding economic development and democratization process in the country. This creates challenges in formulating sound ideological and structural foundation to implement the current democratic developmental state (Ibid).

Vital intellectual debate of the genuine position of developmental state ideology in Ethiopia is a too tricky investigative undertaking. This is to a certain extent due to the ideal of developmental state has been a very recent phenomenon in the Ethiopian development policy makings. In addition, the very changing global, regional and domestic socio-economic, political and security which have been directly or indirectly manipulating Ethiopia's national development policy makings make difficult the task. Furthermore, multifaceted conceptualizations as well as components of developmental state ideology have been additional intellectual dilemmas. To manage these complexities, this work initially conceptualizes the essence and fundamentals of developmental state as basic analytical frameworks (Edigheji, 2010; Mkandawire, 2001).

The concepts in the role of the developmental state have altered since development theory has changed and integrated with the concepts of Amartya Sen's capability approach. Further, the historical situation of development has changed. Screening reallocate in the historical character of economic growth in the course of modern development theory advocates that, in the future, state capacity will have an even greater responsibility to take part in in societal achievement than it did in the last century. It also put forwards that the definite kind of "embeddedness" or "state-society synergy" that was vital to 20th c industrial transformation; intense networks of ties linking the state to industrial elites; will have to be substituted by a much wider, much more "bottom up," set of state-society attachments to secure developmental success in the current century (Leibfried et al 2013).

The article is tried to address the conceptual and practical underpinnings of the political economy of the democratic developmental states of Ethiopia and evaluate it via the concepts of Sen's capability approach. We used the capability approach to substantiate the Ethiopian Democratic developmental state ideology due to the fact that we thought these two concepts are mutually supportive. To accomplish these intended objectives, secondary literatures such as books, articles unpublished thesis, government policies and think tanks were consulted. The aforementioned issue is addressed based on the following research questions.

- What theoretical and conceptual framework is necessary to adopt democratic developmental state?
- What internal and external developments did initiate the EPRDF government to embrace the democratic developmental ideology?

- What challenges and prospects did the Ethiopian government encounter to materialize the intended political ideology?

CONCEPTUALIZING DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IDEOLOGY

Developmental state is usually theoretically situated between liberal open economy model and a central-planned model. The concept of developmental state is not capitalist or socialist. The developmental state is based on amalgamations of positive advantages of private business and the positive role of government. At the first glance, economic development needs a state which can create and regulate appropriate conditions for development. Successful conditions require a state which has the necessary tools to deal with burden, and it is not merely the guardian of certain freedoms. The chief rationale in commencing of the idea of capitalist developmental state was to go ahead of the difference between the American and Soviet economies. Its pedigrees are pinched from the presumption of mercantilism supporting intrusion of the state in the economy ((Bolesta, 2007).

Amratya Sen, who defined the developmental state ideology as beyond sheer numerical augmentation of the national economy a state in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National product (GNP). In light of his view, development can be understood through both its “descriptive and normative” dimension which is basically concerning the socio-economic and political transformations of a state and its society through ensuring fast and equitable economic growth, fair distribution of wealth, democratic governance, basic human freedom, human security and human capacity. Therefore, at this time, the real meaning of development of a state is not only attributed by numerical improvements in the micro-economic performances and productions of its national economy, but also it wants to qualify that normative socio-economic and political governance ((Sen, 1999).

According to the prior understanding about the real meaning of development, a developmental state could be defined as a state that ensures both democratization and fast as well as equitable national economic track records. As such, the notion of democracy and economic development must complementary to each other so that development would be more humane and sustainable in a given state. For that reason, it could be conceptualized as an actively functioning state in deciphering socio-economic troubles of its society and giving wider room to democratic public participation via promoting civil society organizations as well as other democratic institutions to ensure human development (Edigheji, 2010;Makandawere,2001).

In this regard, Edigheji (2010) defined developmental state as the one signify the doctrines of electoral democracy, and guarantees citizens' participation in the development and governance processes and fosters economic growth and development. Developmental state is giving attention to create favorable normative and institutional environments which enable citizenries of the state to change their government through free and fair election, which is among the solid foundations of democratic legitimacy and viability of the state. In addition, it is about the formalization and institutionalization of grass root, inclusive and active citizens' participations and deliberations in the political and economic governance of the state.

To ensure the stability and legitimacy of the system, however, citizens are free to change their governments through free and fair elections. Besides, the actual national development policy makings and implementations of a developmental state shall be participatory to ensure transparency, public trust, accountability, and the rule of law (Edigheji, 2010). Thus, the authority, autonomy and sustainability of a developmental state are therefore on the bases of the preceding normative foundations for

democratic, socio-economic and political governance. As vividly presented above, a developmental state model could be conceptualized as a development policy of building strong institutional, structural and procedural environments. Well qualified technocrats are crucial to implement sustainable development through socio-economic and political transformations.

THE FIVE PILLARS OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

As illustrated the concept earlier, developmental state has fulfill the following five pillars of development. As explained and elaborated by Amratya Sen, the issue of developmental state has embedded democracy within it. So, the success and failure of the democratic developmental state of Ethiopia has to be examined based on these criteria. Even if there are variations in the abstraction of developmental sate, the following section illustrates the major communalities of any developmental state.

Committed Political Leadership

The first attribute of developmental state is the presence of committed and visionary political leadership, which constitutes a primary agency in the construction of a democratic developmental state. It must be the leadership that could define and articulate a clear national development vision for the country; outlines plans and strategies for achieving the goals; builds an elite partnership for support and ownership; builds the technical capacity to elaborate and sustain the agenda; and mobilizes popular support. Developmental leadership is often underpinned by a strong sense of nationalism; a commitment to transform the political condition of the state to a well-functioning democracy, change the structure of production, promote capital accumulation and industrialization. Nevertheless, as stated by the notion of a developmental leadership is about leadership providing clear direction for social and economic change, creating a powerful pro-development constituency among the ruling and bureaucratic elites, and harnessing the critical economic and social forces in the country (ERA, 2011: 97; Lefort, 2013). One of the notable features of the political leadership in all democratic developmental states has been their commitment to developmental ideology to bring about fast, equitable and inclusive economic development (Fritz and Menocal, 2006;Leftwich, 2008: 13). Therefore, a political leadership which does not have the commitment to prioritize development is vicious to ensure developmental state.

Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy

The main attribute of developmental state among other thing is the wish to establish the freedom of its bureaucracy and civil service on the bases of rationality, meritocracy, and long-term professional experiences. These qualities make civil servants more professional and impartial to powerful rent-seeking groups that attempt to influence them (Evans, 1995 cited in Fritz and Menocal, 2006: 8). Thus, developmental states had been able to build and maintain powerful, competent, highly trained and autonomous from the demands of special interests while discharging their professional duties (Leftwich, 2008: 14; Change and Hauge:2019).

As noted by Mann (1986), developmental states have to be quick to develop effective bureaucracies with the means to ensure infrastructural power (Mann, 1986 cited in Leftwich, 2008). Accordingly, it is about their capacity to devise, implement and achieve common national development goals. To this effect, these bureaucracies are expected to be well-trained and there by the fundamentals of their employment, appointment, promotion and demotion need to be competitive, predictable and merit

based rather than political patronage, ethnic and religious considerations (Evans and Rauch, 1999 cited in Leftish, 2008: 14). Professionalism, discipline and technical skills are core issues in administrative competence and capability of the bureaucracies (UNECA, 2005 cited in ERA, 2011).

Deliberated and Coordinated National Development planning

Development planning is a key component of a developmental state. It is about intentionally identifying national development priorities, setting targets, developing strategies, facilitating coordination among various sectors and stakeholders, and establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for achieving short to long term development goals (ERA, 2011). National development planning (NDPs) are essentially plans for public spending and human resource use, and annual budgets are used as instruments for converting a development plan into a program for action (Jefferis, 1998 cited in Maipose, 2003).

National development planning has to be directed by the socio-economic and political transformation of a developmental state. As such, well-thought national development planning and its effective implementation are critical to realize the vision of a developmental state. Also, the basic contents of the national development planning of a developmental state shall also be clearly and consistently identify its major development visions, objectives and strategies on various sectors and principles of socio-economic and political development; democratization, fast and inclusive economic growth, and social justice (Jefferis, 1998 cited in Meyns, 2010).

Sound Social policy

As one criterion of developmental state, grass root and equitable social policy measures are essential to augment income support and gradually reduce income inequality and ensure access to the basic social goods of education, health care and decent livelihoods for people. That means, social policy measures have to meet the fundamental goals of human survival as contained in the MDGs (ERA: 2011; Leftwich, 2008). High investment in skills, education, health care and infrastructure will be imperative tools for expanding human capabilities. Of course, a combination of development strategies that promotes investment in education and infrastructure, such as roads, water and electricity, would improve the environment for doing business in a given state, and attract greater volumes of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Institutional Capacity function

A developmental state project must have long-term institutional perspective and capacity that surpasses any specific political leadership (Ghani, 2005 cited in Fritz and Menocal, 2006:4). When they function well, developmental institutions can help to enhance the efficiency and equity of resource allocation and propagate citizen's greater oversight of the state, thereby creating enabling environment to ensure the accountability, credibility and legitimacy of the government (ERA, 2011). In addition to the existence of crucial developmental institutions and mechanisms, what are critical for an effective developmental state are efficient, effective and democratic socio-political environments that endow them to perform their developmental duties with legitimacy and authority. These environments also provide stakeholders with the voice and representation that enable them to have a sense of ownership of the national development policies and strategies (Evans, 2013).

The presence of strong institutional capacity and practice is also crucial to sustain successful political and economic transformations; strong constitutional democracy, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, representative political institutions, effective central banks and other regulatory bodies, and effective laws, especially in enforcing property rights (ERA, 2011).

THE PREMISES OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN ETHIOPIA

The first premises that initiated Ethiopia for the adopting democratic development ideology is related to external development. The politics of imitation in Ethiopia is manifest to have started in mid 19th c with Imperial Russia as being the first representation for modernization and development. It was then tracked by an endeavor to replica from the Meiji period of the Japanese Empire in the late 19th c and early 20th c. The process of adoption was broken up by the war with Fascist Italia. And then, after the Second World War the British Monarchy come to being as a well-known representation for around three decades. The 1974 revolution brought the military socialist regime which ardently pursued the Soviet Union as a model (Fantini, 2013; Kebede, 1987).

The 1991 overthrow of the socialist regime by an armed struggle did not result in turning to western models, as it happened in other countries, rather to “a revised Marxism distinguished especially by adherence to Stalin’s theory of the national question. Ethiopia’s shift, to model its development project mainly after the 1970s and 80s industrialization experiences of East Asian countries for a developmental model to emulate is still a continuing process (Clapham, 2006; DeWaal, 2013; Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013; Thakur, 2009).

There had been significant changes in the global political economy, which had been hugely impacting the status of Ethiopian political economy. The neo-liberal economic reform measures by Ethiopia following the 1980s chronic debt crisis did not bring about any viable solution to its overall political and socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. As a result, the 1990s has been taken as moment when Ethiopia was in search of alternative development models and 'partners' other than the traditional Western ones. In the mean time, emerging global economies of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russian Federation, South Korea, Turkey and other Middle Eastern rich oil exporting states have bought the demands of Ethiopian government. Most importantly, Ethiopia under Meles Zenaw's leadership had been vocal for China's foreign and economic policies towards Ethiopia claiming that it has been without conditionality (Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017; Change and Hauge,2019).

The economic miracle of South Asian states in their successful economic transformations has also been additional inspiration to Ethiopia to peruse for developmental state model. Finally, deteriorating legitimacy of EPRDF leadership in the mainstream Western traditional partners for its heavily crackdown to political decent, civil society organizations, opposition political parties particularly after the 2005 national election has made Meles Zenawi's leadership of Ethiopia to resort to China. Thus, Meles had been the leading critics against the polices neoliberal global political economy for developmental state and Ethiopia-China 'partnership' as viable policy alternative to effectively respond to pressing national development challenges to the Ethiopian state (Ibid).

From the internal perspective, there have been certain promising criteria that listed by EPRDF government for its implementation of the so called democratic developmental ideology. The government of Ethiopia took an argument for the

need for implementation of this ideology. There have been improvement in various dimensions in the country, such as improved its stability, promising economic development and built strong relations with neighboring countries and the presence of relative peace and security in the country in particular and in the region in general. After the removal of old unitary State in Ethiopia, the EPRDF is still attempting to develop a clear vision something like which Ethiopia and its diverse people can unite. Controlling the political arena for two decades, the EPRDF has been attempting to build a new federal developmental State (Nuova, 2015).

Concerning this, the late prime minister of Ethiopia affirmed that, a democratic developmental state can be characterized as that has the “capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and programs for promoting transformation and growth, as well as for expanding human capabilities”. In his argument there is an assertion that a state takes as its on the whole socio-economic goal, the long-term growth and structural transformation of the economy, with equity. In the ideology of democratic developmental state, the fruit of winning development are dependent on popular support, which is a result from a series of elections. Therefore, the democratic developmental state acquires legitimacy and maintains its power for long duration through both economic performance and democratic procedure (Teferi, 2017). As cited in Eyob 2011:11), Bach (2011) clearly stated PM Meles’ argument in adopting democratic developmental state ideology as follows;

The only way that our organization’s revolutionary democracy direction and behaviour can survive is in a developmental democracy line. It can be said that combining the common features of developmental states with the unique elements of our organization’s revolutionary democracy is a developmental democracy line which is the only way that revolutionary democracy can happen at the present time both at national and international context. In other words, it can be said that developmental democracy can be seen as the only timely manifestation of revolutionary democracy. Revolutionary democracy reveals the historical emergence, revolutionary and democratic behaviour of our organization; hence it is our correct name. Likewise, developmental democracy is also our correct name, because it describes the present day essence of revolutionary democracy as well as the true face of its emergence and realization.

CHALLENGES FOR REALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT STATE IN ETHIOPIA

In the preceding parts, we tried to present the main features of democratic developmental/ capable developmental/ state. Here, we critically see and evaluate the success or failures of the democratic development state Ideology in Ethiopia via the capability approach of the DS criteria.

Challenges in relation to Committed Political Leadership

To effectively and efficiently design and implement its national development vision, developmental state needs a very committed and visionary political leadership (ERA, 2011: 8). If the state owns visionary and committed leadership, it could make its developmental ideology a ‘hegemonic ideology’. Contrary to these fundamentals of democratic developmental state, in Ethiopia, the status and profile of the ruling elites under EPRDF leadership, except some level of exceptional personal

qualification of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, lacks the commitment to deliver this promise. This is basically because of the fact that they have not been qualified in moral, political and academic terms to effectively take on, have possession of and vend such a national vision (Medhane, 2017). Besides, the developmental state ideology has been the brain child of the late PM Meles Zenawi (Feseha and Habtewold, 2017) and hence, it has become personalized to consolidate its highly centralized political leadership to suppress all his potential contenders within or outside of his party (Clapham, 2017: 4; Markakis, 2011; Gudina, 2004 & 2006). Accordingly, ahead of his personal ambition to monopolize power, his leadership did not have the required democratic developmental vision since a well known and concrete doctrine that can help his followers to sustain it for the long run (Da Waal, 2018).

The other attribute of developmental democratic leaders is expected to uncorrupted and non-predatory leadership as the result they could not obstruct economic development rather it could facilitate it (Woldegiyorgis, 2014; Tadessie and Fissaha, 2011). Divergent to this assumption, yet, the elites in Ethiopia use the state power as the principal medium for accumulating wealth through corrupt methods, including the “embezzlement of public funds, receiving bribes from both citizens and foreigners who conduct business with state institutions” (Bekele and Regassa, 2012). Further, as a result of the historically rooted traditions of hierarchy and mystery of the Ethiopian political leadership, patronage is used as a resource for securing political support so that legitimate boundary between public and the private spheres have been blurring (Gemora, 2014). This assertion also affirmed by Evans (1995) as cited in Chang and Huage (2019:2);

Predatory authoritarian states, as opposed to developmental authoritarian states, extract resources from the economy (without giving back), lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals, and create a polity in which personal ties are the only sources of cohesion, and in which individual maximization takes precedence over pursuit of collective goals .

Due to the above factors, politics in Ethiopia has still been widely understood in the sense that informal and non-transparent decision making procedures and institutions override the formal institutions so that Ethiopia is an authoritarian state with predatory attributes rather than authoritarian developmental state (Chang and Huage, 2019).

Challenges of Establishing Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic institutions in Ethiopia are not autonomous. They are strongly subjective by the ruling elite. The higher positions in many governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based quota system. Because of this, instead of transparency, the desire to fulfill the interests of the political schema established the persuasion for corruption that has become prevalent in the performance of the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Even if there are smart policies on the paper, they failed due to lack of committed personals. Many productive projects were undeservedly postponed due to the functionaries be deficient in the professionalism and commitment required to marshal the limited resources of the nation for development (Beresu, 2015; Bonda, 2011).

In the regional level, there is self-governing ethnic groups’ as approved by ethnic federalism constitution. But there is shortage in human resources in many regions. As the result, the least developing regions faced shortage of well trained and educated

manpower. Notwithstanding, there is an option to recruit qualified professionals from their counterpart the local ethnic communities who have no significant knowledge of the tasks dominated key political, bureaucratic and government posts in such regions. This is further justified with the right of the ethnic self-administration discourse in Ethiopia's ethnic federal principles. In rare cases, the non indigenous people have been employed in another region for work but they could not succeed as the result of ethnic federal principle which has strained a classification of "insiders" and "outsiders". The so called insiders may have no professional skills whereas the outsiders are not motivated to work due to these classifications. This circumstance has twisted a chance for the EPRDF to take part in a contentious role in determining and distressing politics in the regional state. In such state of affairs, without competent, merit-based bureaucracy, the country will shortly face implementation failure and exposed to the danger of rent-seeking (Beres, 2015; 2015; Bonda, 2011; Change and Hauge, 2019).

National Development Planning Challenges

The first challenge of any democratic developmental state is the mobilization of people and resources for the developmentalist project persuasively. In Ethiopia, the developmental state is viewed as one of the two pillars of the "national renaissance." together with the other pillar (democratic federalism), "the establishment and consolidation of an effective developmental state" is anticipated to show the way to a national transformation that is no less than a rebirth. The present Ethiopian state has set its vision on establishing a democratic rule, a system of good governance and social justice based on the self-government of the people. This is meant to contribute to rapid economic growth. Ethiopia's vision, the GTP holds, is: "to become a country where democratic rule, good governance and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free will of its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the level of middle-income economy as of 2020-2023" (Change and Hauge, 2019; Eyob, 2017; UNDP, Ethiopia, 2012).

This is further reinforced in the part that explicates the vision for the economic sector which reiterates that the vision is to build an economy which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the sustaining economic development and securing social justice and increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach the level of those in middle-income countries (Bonda, 2011; UNDP, Ethiopia, 2012).

In order to achieve the stated objective of the development policy of the country, "Ethiopia government led by a strong top leader is to give incentives (carrots) and disincentives (sticks) to the actors of economic growth such as farmers, workers, merchants, entrepreneurs, and foreign firms so they are forced to change behavioral patterns from rent seeking to value creation". Even though, small farmers are the most significant collaborator in political alliance, the government implements top-down guidance for productivity enhancement via "carrots" for agricultural and rural development, rather than responding to their voices in policy formulation in a bottom-up fashion. In this regard, the participation of small farmers in political coalition with the present government remains a passive one (Ohno, 2009).

The urban economic and intellectual elites in Ethiopia are not formed. The intellectual class, students and professionals are until small in number. In the meantime, rich farmers and landlords were vanished by the earlier government. As the result, it is

doubtful that these parts of the population will happen to a well-built collaborator in political coalition at the present and in the near future. In addition, the Ethiopian Diaspora generally develops a negative attitude toward the present government. Thus without successful integration and participation of these portion of the society, it is impossible to address the short and long term development objectives of Ethiopia (Ibid).

Another attributes that the Ethiopian developmental state is said to have not fulfilled the basic features of its East Asian forms is that its interventionist affinity is very much to the extent of being market unfriendly. While the DS is anticipated to sketch the developmental plans, intrude in the implementation of its strategies, guide the market with legal frameworks and carrot schemes, assess the outcome of the results but leave the market to free competition, in Ethiopia the government intervenes into the functioning of the market. The government in Ethiopia involved in the hard price control, the government puts on different products and the anti notice drive it instigates all in the name of controlling inflation and protecting consumers. Direct possession of businesses by the government, to the extent of absolute monopoly led to some to wind up that the Ethiopian government, implicitly adopted a centrally planned economic model. Others are inclined to see the Ethiopian representation to be more of the ‘authoritarian developmental state’ that follows the ‘Beijing consensuses’ than the market friendly developmental state (Desta, 2011; Thakur, 2009).

Challenges in Establishing Sound Social Policy

In social sectors, the Ethiopian spends more of its budget on the provision of social services such as health care, infrastructures and education. The Ethiopian government dedicated around 64 percent of its budget on pro-poor sectors like education, health, agriculture, water, electricity, and roads (Gemora, 2014:). It also spends 2.2 percent of its GDP on health and has achieved a remarkable trend in establishing health services according to its 0.619 health index. Besides, about 20 percent of its GDP is spent to reengineer its infrastructure, such as roads, schools, railways, air transport, dams, and telecommunication services (Change and Hauge, 2019; Gemora, 2014). Thus, as a result of all these expenditures for the provision of social services and infrastructures, people living below the poverty line in Ethiopia has declined from 41.9 in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011 (Gemora,2014). In the same way, due to poverty reduction and access to health benefits and the expansion of the Ethiopian economy, the HDI, measuring life expectancy, the level of assuring life expectancy, the level of schooling (adult literacy rate), and real GDP per capita (standard of living), Ethiopia's HDI improved by 16 percent from 0.313 in 2005 to 0.363 in 2011(Woldegiyorgis, 2014).

However, regardless of these positive developments, government’s priorities to access to the preceding social services have been significantly compromising quality and standards of those services. Besides, regardless of the massive expansions of infrastructures such as roads, railways, power plants, dams and other strategic investments their durability has been below the minimum standards so that they could not qualify the standards of developmental state ideology, which stands for durable infrastructures to ensure sustainable development (Change and Hauge, 2019; Fesseha and Abtewold,2017).

Among the basic qualifications of developmental state in social sectors, investment on human resource devolvement through education is essential to feed the bureaucracy and civil service with sufficient meritocratic manpower. In this regard, the

government of Ethiopia has shown its commitment towards the expansion of education to meet the Millennium Development Goal of 100 percent primary school completion by 2015 (World Bank, 2005 cited in Woldegiyorgis, 2014). Consequently, this policy has resulted in massive expansion of education at all levels, particularly at elementary and high school levels.

Ethiopia's education policy, however, has been emphasizing on access, rather than the quality of education: students are not learning practically as they do not have the appropriate tools and equipped laboratories to practice; financial support for research is very low; low quality of students introduced to higher education; insufficient supplies of text and reference books, laboratory and workshop equipment and access to ICT facilities; insufficient staff, with no appropriate skills. Also, the problem is there is lack integration or synergy of what is taught at school and what the industry demands. This has resulted in the 'fruitless' and unemployment of huge number of students. It is not uncommon now days to see several unemployed graduates as a result of this education policy. This shows that the state is not playing its role as a regulator of the supply and demand of graduates (FDRE, MoE, 2010).

Thus, the government conducted various institutional reforms in unsustainable and uncoordinated manner. The reform was good beginning but it lack effectiveness, innovation and continuity. The government failed to create the capable, accountable and modern civil servant based on the level of new economic and social development in the country. This erodes the credibility of civil services that could have been played major role in national transformation (Adugna, 2016).

Challenges Related to Establishing Institutional Capacity

As it has been communicated previously, in a developmental state, the promotion of democratic norms, institutions and structures are essential to ensure the basic rights and liberties of citizens. As such, these fundamental manifestations of democratic nation building project could in turn result in the realization of a legitimate, viable and well-functioning state which is capable of realizing its national development agenda (Change and Hauge, 2019; Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017). Critical evaluation of its existential status reveals that Ethiopia could not qualify the underlying parameters of developmental state. First of all, though its 1995 federal constitution incorporates the basic normative standards of human and democratic rights of Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples, it has been hampered by critical procedural and implementation irregularities and gaps (Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017).

The modus operandi of the constitutional formulation process of the 1995 constitution had not been conducted on the bases of grassroots public deliberations and consensus of the majority of the Ethiopian people. As a result, it still questionably reflects the shared vision of significant portions of Ethiopians. As an illustration polarizations of positions have still been observed among significant number of Ethiopian citizens on the structure of the federal arrangement, particularly of the secession clause of the constitution (Woldegiyorgis, 2014; Tadessie and Fissaha, 2011).

Accordingly, in the absence of an all inclusive and grass root deliberative engagements among the major sections and corners of Ethiopian citizens on the major premises of the federal constitution, consensual understanding and ownership over the fundamentals of the constitution has still been lacking. Unfortunately, such top-down and closed public policy formulation procedures have also been common across all other major post-constitutional legislations and policies including the recent

Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I (in 2010), Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) II (in 2015), and Addis Ababa City Integrated Master Plan. Thus, the absence of such a tradition for wider public participations and deliberations across major policy makings and enforcements in Ethiopia could not be compatible with the standard of democratic developmental state.

In relation to implementation, in spite of its constitutional axioms for the right of Ethiopian, nations, and people to self rule, power has still been highly centralized. Accordingly, as a result of a highly secretive, closed and centralized party discipline of EPRDF, federal as well as regional political power has still been concentrated at the federal government under a one man leadership of Meles Zenawi and post-Meles centralized collective EPRDF leadership. His one man authoritarian rule as well as post-Meles centralized collective leadership had been a threat to the underling maxim of democratic federalism, which is basically about striking the legitimate and reasonable balance between shard rule and self administration (De Waal, 2012; Arriola & Lyons, 2016).

As it had been communicated in the preceding paragraph, regardless of the nominal federal constitutional architecture, the right to self administration of regional states, their right to fair power share in various political leaderships of the federal government, their quest fair distributions national wealth, infrastructures and other relevant social services have still been usurped by the Abyssinian core elites of TPLF (Markakis, 2011; Gudina, 2004, Mengisteab, 2007). As a result, the absence such democratic nation building practices has still been missing. Thus, it could be impossible for the EPRDF leadership to purse for developmental state path in Ethiopia since it fails to effect democratic federalism to reconcile different interests of Ethiopian society for a common national development vision on the bases of national consensus and mutual trust.

Among the fundamental ingredients of the democratic legitimacy of a political leadership of a state and democratic nation building project, creating enabling environment to conduct free, fair and periodic election is critical. Beyond recognizing it under the FDRE constitution, however, Ethiopia under EPRDF political leadership did not conduct an election which is up to the universal standards with the exception of 2005 national election (Gudina, 2006; Mengisteab, 2007).

Following 2005 remarkable national election, the EPRDF leadership took authoritarian measures so that more than 200 opposition supporters were killed by atrocious security forces and nearly 30,000 were arrested together with the top opposition party leaders (Arriola & Lyons, 2016.). In addition to this, new laws were originated to weaken human and democratic rights institutions and actors such as the media, civil society and opposition parties (Abebe, 2012). In this regard, both 'Charities and Societies Proclamation' and 'Anti-Terrorism Proclamation' were being introduced in 2009 alone. As a result, under the new civil society law, any foreign Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is banned from engaging in work pertaining to human rights and democratic governance (Bekele and Regassa, 2012; Matfess, 2015:193). Also, as per the ambiguous and vague interpretations of the anti-terrorism proclamation, a number of opposition party members and journalists were imprisoned so that the basic constitutional rights of freedom of expression and association have been curtailed.

Against the basic norms and practices of democratic developmental ideology, the political space to entertain political decent had been extremely narrowed as a result of repressive government measures, which forced journalists and opposition political party leaders to leave Ethiopia fearing violent government measures. As a final resort, some of the opposition politicians chose armed struggle so that they become threats to the stability of the state (Kebede, 2011). In the recent two national elections of

2010 and 2015, EPRDF claimed to win about 96% and 100% of the seats the federal parliament. The net effect of all the preceding authoritarian and highly centralized nation building practices has resulted in nation-wide violent protests since 2015, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia regions, against the legitimacy of EPRDF.

The people, particularly of the youth, are demanding what the state has not been able to ensure democratic federalism, equitable distribution of wealth and employment opportunity (Al Jazeera, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017). As a result, the government has been violently responding to peaceful protesters, which ultimately resulted in 1500 number of death of innocent civilians by security forces, signals of communal conflicts, and over 1 million internally displaced people (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

Soon after independence, in the global south, the suitability of the role of the state in the development process has been becoming a debatable topic. The hub of debate has centered on two main courses: “the minimalist state and maximalist state. However, it was after the mid 1990s, the news thinking, developmental state, come to being. This new view is emanated from much respect on achievements of a number of Asian countries based on state-led development policy. The acknowledgment of the developmental success of East Asian countries has developed new world view on what the state should follow. The experience shows that market based economies needs functioning, capable state in order to grow and well operating. The fundamental nature of developmental state ideology could be understood as building the capacity of a state to address its diverse development challenges. As such, it is basically about creating enabling normative, structural, institutional, technical, and administrative environments in a given state to achieve its national development vision.

The main features of democratic developmental state are its ability in formulating ideological sound and establishing capable institution to implement the overarching development policies. From this points of view, Ethiopia as democratic developmental state lacks the will and the institutional capacity. Although, EPRDF regime strives to be visionary and suppose ideological hegemony, the bureaucracy remain ill equipped to carry out the accountability of developmental state. Theoretically the Ethiopian government formulating a democratic developmental state ideology which has many attributes of the capability approach of developmental state ideology. But the democratization process and practice remained on paper. The dominance of party loyalty at the expense of merit and endorsement coupled with corruption and rent-seeking political economy would be worsening the country’s existence and development.

Moreover, the practice of multiparty democracy, credible election, and functioning civil society organizations have not been experienced. In addition, the ruling party has become repressive to political decent, freedom of expression, freedom of association and other basic civil as well as political liberties of Ethiopian citizens. The extreme politicization of ethnicity has been dragging Ethiopia towards wide spread communal conflicts, which have been threatening to the viability of the Ethiopian federation.

In social dimension, despite the fact that Ethiopia spends more of its budget on the provision of social services such as health care, infrastructures and education, its priorities to access to the preceding social services has been significantly compromising

quality and standards of those service. Furthermore, in spite of the massive expansions of infrastructures their durability has been below the minimum standards so that they could not qualify the standards of capable developmental state.

Thus, generally when we assess social, economic, political, and other attributes of democratic developmental state or capable developmental states, Ethiopia even if there are some promising steps, does not qualify such qualities. As the result, the country needs capable, committed and visionary leaders, who can understand the current situation and able to formulate and implement democratic developmental state ideology which can fulfill the current capability approaches of developmental state ideology.

REFERENCES

Adem, A. (2012). *Rule by Law in Ethiopia: Rendering Constitutional Limits on Government Power Nonsensical*. Centre of Governance and Human Rights, Cambridge University.

Al Jazeera. (2016, October 10). *Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency Over Protests*. Retrieved January 2019, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html>

Arriola, R., & Lyons, T. (2016). Ethiopia's 100% Election. *Journal of Democracy* , 76-88.

Bach, J. (2011). Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review of EPRDF's conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* , 641-663.

Bagchi, K. (2004). *The developmental state in history and in the twentieth century*. New Delhi: Regency Publications.

Beresa, A. J. (2015). Ethnic federalism and democratic developmental state in Ethiopia: Some Points of Contradiction. *International Journal of Political Science and Development* , 291-300.

Bolesta, A. (2007). China as a developmental state. *Montenegrin Journal of economics*, 3(5), 105-111.

Bonda, S. (2011). Impact of ethnic federalism in building developmental state of Ethiopia. Unpublished masters thesis, Graduate School of Development Studies, International Institute of Social Studies, The Heagues, Netherlands.

Chang, Ha-Joon Hauge, Jostein, 2019. The Concept of a 'Developmental State' in Ethiopia: The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy, Oxford University Press

Clapham, C. (2018). The Ethiopian developmental state. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(6), 1151-1165.

De Waal, A. (2012). The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi. *African Affairs*, Volume 112, Issue 446, January 2013, Pages 148-155

De Waal, A. (2018). The future of Ethiopia: developmental state or political marketplace? Somerville, Massachusetts.

Deen, E. S. (2011). The developmental state: An illusion in contemporary times. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 5(9), 424-436.

Edigheji, O. (2010). Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potentials and challenges. Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 1-33.

Evans, P., & Heller, P. (2015). Human development, state transformation and the politics of the developmental state. The Oxford handbook of transformations of the state, 691-713.

- Fantini, E. (2013). Developmental state, economic transformation and social diversification in Ethiopia. *ISPI Analysis*, 163(7).
- Fisseha, T., & Tadesse, M. (2011). *Ethiopia and the APRM: A Path to Nowhere. A Critical Assessment*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Open Society Foundations.
- Fourie, E. (2011). *Ethiopia and the search for Alternative exemplars of Development*. Italy: University of Toronto.
- Freedom House. (2015). Overview. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom.../2015/Ethiopia>.
- Freedom House. (2016). *Freedom in the world 2016: Anxious dictators, wavering democracies: Global freedom under pressure*. Freedom House (Washington, DC), 3.
- Fritz, V., & Menocal, A. R. (2006). (Re) building developmental states: from theory to practice. Overseas Development Institute.
- Gamora, G.(2014). *Developmental State in Africa: The Emerging Experience of Ethiopia*. A Paper accepted by the Ethiopian Economic Association for July 2014 Conference, Presentation and Subsequent publication.
- Gebremariam, E. B. The Carrot and Stick of Ethiopian “Democratic Developmentalism”: Ideological, Legal, and Policy Frameworks. *Developmental State*, 61.
- Gebremariam, F. M., & Bayu, A. M. (2017). Ethiopia: A Democratic Developmental State?. *ILIRIA International Review*, 7(2), 153-170.
- Gebremariam, T. The ‘Democratic Developmental State’ in Ethiopia: Origin, Challenges and Prospects. *Cultures of Democracy in Ethiopia*, 88.
- Gudina, M. (2004). Ethiopia: Constraints to transition and democratization, in Nhema, A. (ed), *The quest for peace in Africa*, 245-267. Addis Ababa: OSSREA.
- Gudina, M. (2006). Contradictory interpretations of Ethiopian history: The need for a new consensus. *Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, 119-130.
- Index, D. (2015). *Democracy in an age of anxiety. A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit 2015*. The Economist.
- Kebede, M. (2011). The fallacy of TPLF’s developmental state. *Ethiopian Review*.
- Kieh, G. K. (2015). Constructing the social democratic developmental state in Africa: lessons from the “Global South”. *Bandung: Journal of the Global South*, 2(1), 2.
- Leftwich, A. (2008). *Developmental states, effective states and poverty reduction*. UNRISD (Ed.). *Combating Poverty and Inequality*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Maipose, G. S. (2003). Economic development and the role of the state in Botswana. *DPMN Bulletin*, 10(2), 1-5.
- Markakis, J. (2011). *Ethiopia: The last two frontiers*. Boydell & Brewer Ltd.
- Martinelli, M., & Pirozzi, N. (Eds.). (2015). *Promoting Stability and Development in Africa: How to Foster Cooperation between Public and Private Sectors (Vol. 21)*. Edizioni Nuova Cultura.
- Matfess, H. (2015). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men. *African Studies Review*, 58(2), 181-204.

- Medhane Tadesse. 2017. The Developmental State in Ethiopia: Congenital Anomalies or Inertia? The Current Analyst. Retrieved from <https://medium.com/the-current-analyst/the-developmental-state-in-ethiopia-congenital-anomalies-or-inertia-56bc3cdd927d>
- Mengisteab, K. (2007). Identity politics, democratisation and state building in Ethiopia's federal arrangement. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(2), 63-92.
- Meyns, P. (2010). Botswana: a developmental state in Africa. *The Developmental State in Africa: Problems and Prospects*. Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Miletzki, J., & Broten, N. (2017). *Development as freedom*. Macat Library.
- Mkandawire, T. (2001). Thinking about developmental states in Africa. *Cambridge journal of economics*, 25(3), 289-314.
- MoFED.(2010). Growth and transformation plan 2010/11-2014/15. Retrieved from www.iaa.org/media/pams/.../Ethiopia_GTP_2010to2015.
- MoIbrahim Foundation. (2015). The 2015 Ibrahim index of African governance: Key findings. Retrieved from <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/news/2015/the-2015-ibrahim-index-of-african-governance-key-findings>
- Ohno, K. (2009, June). Ethiopia: Political regime and development policies. In GRIPS development forum.
- Praag, B. (2006). *Ethiopia and political renaissance in Africa*. New York, Nova Publishers.
- Teferi, Mengistu, 2017. developmental state paradigm in ethiopia: lessons for the horn of Africa. *International Journal of Political Science, Law and International Relations (IJPSLIR)*, 7 (3), 21-36
- Teshome, A. (2016, December 8). *Economic Development and Democracy in Ethiopia: Performance and Challenges*. Retrieved 2016, from Tigray Online: www.tigraionline.com/articles/development-democracy2016.html
- Thakur, M. (2009). *Building on Progress? Chinese Engagement in Ethiopia*1.
- UNDP, Ethiopia. (2012). *Democratization in a developmental State: The Case of Ethiopia Issues, Challenges, and Prospects*. UNDP.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, & Union, A. (2011). *Governing development in Africa: The role of the State in economic transformation*. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
- Woldegiyorgis, A. (2014). *The Ethiopian developmental state and its challenges*. Available at SSRN 2512907.
- Zenawi, M. (2006). *African development: Dead ends and new beginnings*. Preliminary draft.
- Zenawi, M. (2012). States and markets: Neoliberal limitations and the case for a developmental state. *Good growth and governance in Africa: Rethinking development strategies*, 140-174.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh, Lecturer and Researcher, Department of social anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Bahir Dar University

Gubaye Assaye Alamineh, lecturer and researcher, Department of social anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Bahir Dar University